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2Introduction
• The World Bank (1993) once praised Hong Kong for having 
achieved “a remarkable record of high and sustained 
economic growth” and for having been “unusually 
successful at sharing the fruits of growth” during the period 
1965 to 1990. 
• In the past two decades, Hong Kong’s economy has 
continued to grow, with GDP increasing at an average 
annual rate of 5.1% in real terms. 
• But growth with equity is no longer a feature of Hong 
Kong’s “miraculous” economic development.
3• The process of de-industrialization that has taken place since 
the 1980s and the years of economic adversity that followed 
the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis have hit manual 
workers and lower-income groups the hardest.
• The Gini coefficient rose from 0.453 in 1986 to 0.533 in 
2006.
• As many scholars have emphasized, the subjective 
perception of inequality is more important than actual 
inequality. Public tolerance of inequality has become a key 
factor in the political calculus of redistributive government 
interventions.
4This paper aims:
• To describe the patterns and changes in public perceptions of 
domestic income inequality in the past two decades.
• To explain to what extent people’s structural positions and 
attitudes towards inequality affect their perception and 
appraisal of income inequality.
5Data and Method
The data used to chart attitudinal trends came from a longitudinal 
Social Indicators Survey project.
• Nine rounds of face-to-face interviews were conducted from 
1988 to 2006.
• The target population of these surveys were Hong Kong 
residents. 
• The samples were drawn by means of a multistage stratified 
systematic sampling scheme.
6• Questions relating to perceptions of income inequality are not 
available in all of the surveys. Specifically, 
1. A question regarding the public’s perception of income 
inequality has been included in the core section since 1995.
2. Another question capturing the public’s appraisal of income 
inequality was included in the special topics section in five 
survey years.
3. Questions probing possible determinants of perceptions of 
inequality were only included in the special topics section 
of the 2001 survey.
7Definition
• Income inequality is defined as the gap that exists between the 
rich and the poor. 
• This conception is broader in scope than job-related earnings or 
wage inequality. 
• Studies have demonstrated that the distribution of wealth is 
more unequal than the distribution of earnings. 
8Trends in Perceived Income Inequality
• Our analysis focuses on two dimensions of perceived income 
inequality: 
1. Perception of income inequality, i.e. the perceived 
seriousness of income disparities.
2. Appraisal of income inequality, i.e. the perceived justness 
of income disparities.
• To highlight the public’s aversion to income inequality, a 
dichotomized score was computed for each of these variables, 
where 0 stood for neutral and positive attitudes towards income 
inequality and 1 for negative attitudes.
• Off-scale responses were excluded in calculating the score and 
were interpreted as an indicator of uncertainty. 
9Table 1 Perception of the seriousness of income disparities, 1995-2006 (%) 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 2004 2006 
Degree of seriousness1       
Very minor 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Minor 7.7 6.6 7.3 3.5 5.5 5.0 
Average 33.2 22.9 26.9 15.7 19.2 19.0 
Serious 41.5 43.8 47.4 50.7 47.3 49.6 
Very serious 17.0 26.0 17.9 29.7 27.4 25.9 
  (n) (2,102) (2,007) (3,075) (3,907) (3,103) (3,233) 
Seriousness mean score1, 2 0.59 (0.49) 0.70 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) 0.80 (0.40) 0.75 (0.44) 0.76 (0.43) 
  % change3 ― 18.6*** -7.1** 23.1*** -6.3*** 1.3 
% of uncertainty4 7.8 5.3 6.1 5.3 5.7 6.1 
 
10
Table 2 Evaluation of the justness of income disparities, 1990-2001 (%) 
 1990 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Degree of justness1      
Just 31.9 21.4 28.7 19.2 13.1 
Average ― 0.9 ― 28.1 24.0 
Unjust 68.1 77.7 71.3 52.7 62.9 
  (n) (323) (323) (614) (702) (700) 
Unjustness mean score1, 2 0.68 (0.47) 0.78 (0.42) 0.71 (0.45) 0.53 (0.50) 0.63 (0.48) 
  % change3 ― 14.7** -9.0* -25.4*** 18.9*** 
% of uncertainty4 17.2 20.8 12.4 14.7 14.8 
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According to our findings (Tables 1 and 2): 
1. Public uncertainty about the pattern of income distribution has 
remained relatively stable:
Around 6% of our respondents refused to evaluate the 
seriousness of existing income disparities. 
2. Public uncertainty about distributive justice is significantly 
higher than about the pattern of income distribution:
Around 16% did not hold a definite view on the justness 
of existing income disparities.
12
3. Public awareness of income disparities has been persistently 
high: 
In most of the survey years, at least seven out of ten rated 
the situation as serious or very serious.
4. The public’s appraisal of income inequality showed a 
fluctuating trend: 
In the early and mid 1990s, about three quarters of our 
respondents considered existing income disparities in 
Hong Kong to be unjust. The corresponding percentage 
dropped considerably to 52.7% in 1999, and bounded 
back to 62.9% in 2001.
13
5. A comparison of people’s perception and appraisal of income 
inequality testifies to the multidimensional nature of public opinion 
on income inequality: 
These two subjective measures of income inequality were 
positively, but not strongly, correlated (in 1995, 1997, 1999, 
and 2001, the Pearson’s R values of the seriousness mean 
score and the unjustness mean score were 0.217, 0.283, 0.317, 
and 0.294, respectively). 
In the years of economic prosperity, people tended to be 
more critical of the aspect of justness than of seriousness, 
but the opposite held true during the years of economic 
adversity. For instance, in 1995, while only 58.5% of our
respondents rated the situation of income disparities as serious, 
77.7% believed such inequality to be unjust. But in 2001, 
when 80.4% considered the situation of income disparities to 
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Figure 1 traces the trends in income inequality in both objective 
(i.e., the Gini coefficient) and subjective terms:
• The rise in the perceived seriousness of income disparities was 
more rapid than that of the Gini coefficient. 
• Despite a continuous rise in the Gini coefficient, the perceived 
unjustness of income disparities showed a downward trend in 
the mid and late 1990s.
• The trend in the Gini coefficient would seem to fluctuate less 
than in both of the subjective measures of income inequality. 
Yet it should be noted that the years in which the two 
subjective measures exhibited prominent fluctuations, i.e., 1995
and 1999, lack comparable Gini coefficient estimates. 
• The different trajectories of these three measures serve to
illustrate the complex relationship between “actual” and
subjective perceptions of income inequality.
16
Determinants of Income Inequality Perceptions
Three common approaches to individual differences in attitudes towards 
inequality. 
1. The structural position thesis:
Attitudes towards inequality are shaped and/or systematically distorted 
by a person’s position in the stratification system or reward hierarchy. 
The higher a person’s socio-economic position, the more 
income inequality a person believes to be legitimate. 
2. The dominant ideology thesis:
An individual’s beliefs and attitudes are influenced by the dominant
values in society relating to stratification (e.g., beliefs in egalitarianism 
and meritocracy). 
The stronger a person’s egalitarian and non-meritocratic views, the more 
likely a person is to criticize income differences as being too large.
17
3. The reflection thesis:
A person’s beliefs reflect the situation prevailing in the real 
world. 
The greater the degree of income inequality a person perceives 
there to be, the more likely that person is to regard income 
differences as too large. 
• Other factors such as experiences related to personal 
stratification (e.g., income mobility) and expectations (e.g., 
expected future income position), and a changing zeitgeist (e.g., 
with the legitimacy of inequality decreasing over time, younger 
people are more opposed to inequality than older people) have 
also been found to be possible determinants of attitudes towards 
inequality.
18
Due to limitations in the available data, we could only select the 
following three sets of variables:
1. An individual’s socio-economic position:
• Measured by sex, age, education, occupation status, monthly 
household income, place of birth, and subjective social class. 
• Males, younger people, the locally born, and those with a 
relatively high level of education, income, occupational status, 
and subjective social class usually occupy higher socio-
economic positions. 
• It was assumed that: people in higher socio-economic positions 
are less likely to perceive income disparities to be serious and 
unjust.
19
2. Individual stratification-related experiences and expectations:
• Measured by:
(1) the financial capacity to make ends meet; and 
(2) confidence in the prospects of one’s family. 
• It was assumed that: people whose family income is sufficient 
to pay for daily expenses and who anticipate an improvement in 
their family’s standard of living would be less likely to perceive 
income disparities to be serious and unjust.
20
3. Attitudes towards inequality:
• Measured by:
(1) the attribution of the cause of poverty – whether poverty is a result
of social or individual factors; 
(2) a preference for redistribution – whether social welfare would make
people less willing to rely on their own means to take care of
themselves; 
(3) a preference for redistributive government intervention – whether 
the government should cut social welfare; 
(4) a commitment to redistributive government intervention – whether
the government should introduce new taxes; 
(5) trust in the government – whether the government pays more 
attention to the interests of the rich or to those of the people; and 
(6) support for self-reliance – whether people should rely on their 
own means in times of public budget austerity. 
• It was assumed that: people who adopt “individual” explanations of poverty, 
have no preference for redistribution nor for redistributive government 
intervention, trust the government in attending to public interests, and 
support self-reliance are less likely to perceive income disparities to be 
serious and unjust.
21
Table 7 Odd ratios for the logistic regression of the perception and appraisal of income inequality on 
socio-demographic and attitudinal variables, 2001 
   Seriousness   Justness 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Males [females] 0.74 ― 0.64 0.65  0.83 ― 0.94 1.01 
Age [<30]          
 30-54 1.38 ― 1.22 1.10  1.26 ― 1.27 1.21 
 55 1.00 ― 1.08 0.90  1.10 ― 1.10 1.12 
Education [primary or below]          
 Secondary 1.22 ― 1.37 1.32  0.98 ― 0.87 0.83 
 Tertiary 0.63 ― 0.50 0.41  1.27 ― 1.07 1.39 
Occupation status [manual workers]          
 Managerial/professional 0.79 ― 0.76 0.67  1.25 ― 1.11 1.15 
 Clerical/sales/service 0.78 ― 0.84 0.81  1.24 ― 1.34 1.35 
 Economically inactive 0.83 ― 0.68 0.56  1.48 ― 1.18 1.26 
Monthly household income 
[<HK$10,000] 
         
 HK$10,000-29,999 0.63 ― 0.32* 0.28**  1.10 ― 0.85 1.07 
 HK$30,000 0.97 ― 0.72 0.54  1.17 ― 1.45 1.56 
 Unknown 0.98 ― 0.75 0.59  1.09 ― 1.25 1.48 
Locally born 
[born outside Hong Kong] 
1.50 ― 1.48 1.29  1.25 ― 1.13 1.06 
Subjective social class [lower]          
 Lower-middle 0.96 ― 1.24 1.49  0.47** ― 0.60 0.57 
 Middle or above 0.58 ― 0.79 1.10  0.29*** ― 0.40** 0.41* 
Financial capacity ― 1.02 1.07 1.14  ― 0.87 0.86 0.83 
Confidence in family’s prospects ― 0.84 0.88 0.92  ― 0.82 0.88 0.88 
Attribution of poverty [social factors]          
 Individual factors ― 0.56* 0.50* 0.68  ― 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 Indecisive ― 0.67 0.58 0.81  ― 0.41** 0.33*** 0.36** 
Preference for redistribution ― 1.08 1.13 1.16  ― 0.87 0.91 0.89 
Preference for redistributive government 
intervention 
― 0.85 0.90 1.03  ― 0.80 0.79 0.79 
Commitment to redistributive government 
intervention 
― 0.90 0.90 0.84  ― 0.92 0.96 0.99 
Trust in government [rich fare better]          
 People fare better ― 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.32**  ― 0.44** 0.44** 0.59 
 Indecisive ― 0.53* 0.50* 0.63  ― 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.44** 
Support for self-reliance ― 1.18 1.16 1.11  ― 1.12 1.13 1.09 
Perceived seriousness of income disparities ― ― ― ―  ― ― ― 4.22*** 
Perceived justness of income disparities ― ― ― 4.31***  ― ― ― ― 
n 730 592 560 514  655 545 516 514 
Model 
2
 23.21 31.07** 57.58*** 84.76***  27.51* 94.40*** 106.74*** 134.27*** 
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.051 0.082 0.158 0.243  0.056 0.216 0.253 0.312 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Notes: Income disparities are serious = 1, others = 0. 
Income disparities are unjust = 1, others = 0. 
The respective reference groups of independent variables are in parentheses. 
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Logistics regressions were conducted to explore how individual socio-
economic positions and inequality-related attitudinal orientations affect 
the perception and appraisal of income inequality (Table 7) : 
1. The explanatory powers were significantly stronger in explaining the 
perceived justness than the perceived seriousness of income 
disparities. The difference was particularly notable in Model 2, where 
inequality-related attitudinal variables explained 21.6% of the 
variance in the evaluation of distributive justice, while the explained 
variance in perceived seriousness was only 8.2%. 
2. The effects of inequality-related attitudinal variables were stronger 
than socio-economic position variables in explaining both the
perception and appraisal of income inequality, especially the latter. 
While inequality-related attitudinal variables explained 21.6% of the 
variance in the perceived justness of income disparities, individual 
socio-economic positions could explain only 5.6% of the variance 
in this respect.
23
3. Our findings seemed to give partial, albeit rather direct, support 
to the structural position thesis:
• People with a middle level of income were 0.72 times less 
likely than low-income people to perceive existing income 
disparities to be a serious problem (in Model 4, the odd 
ratio was 0.28).
• Those who identified with the middle class or above were 
about half as likely as those who identified with the lower 
class to consider existing income disparities to be unjust 
(in Model 4, the odd ratio was 0.41).
4. People with different stratification-related experiences and 
expectations, i.e., the financial capacity to make ends meet and 
confidence in the prospects of one’s family, varied slightly in 
their perception and appraisal of income inequality.
24
5.  Inequality-related attitudes showed a similar pattern in shaping 
the perception and appraisal of income inequality. 
• The perceived justness/seriousness of income disparities 
stood out as the most influential factor, followed by 
attribution of poverty and trust in the government.
• Those who did not consider existing income disparities to 
be unjust or serious, blamed poverty on the poor 
themselves, and trusted the government to pay attention to 
the interests of the people were less likely than their 
counterparts to perceive existing income disparities to be 
serious or unjust.
25
• For example, those who regarded existing income 
disparities as unjust were about 4.31 times more likely than 
those who thought otherwise to perceive income disparities 
to be a serious problem. In a similar vein, those who 
regarded existing income disparities as serious were about 
4.22 times more likely than those who thought otherwise to 
judge existing income disparities to be unjust. 
• Other attitudes, such as a preference for redistribution, a 
preference for and commitment to redistributive 
government intervention, and support for self-reliance, 
appeared to have an insignificant independent impact. 
26
Conclusion and Discussion
• The problem of income inequality, in both objective and 
subjective terms, in Hong Kong is worse than in many other 
affluent societies. The high level of concern over the issue is 
undoubtedly rooted in the cultural tradition and fuelled by the 
aggravating reality. 
• While the government has the resources to alleviate poverty 
and public awareness and disapproval of income disparities 
have been persistently high, there is little sign of Hong Kong 
becoming a “social volcano” on the verge of exploding due to 
anger over growing income gaps. The popular understanding 
of poverty is still biased towards “individual” explanations, 
and is embedded in a culture of self-amelioration.
27
• People in different socio-economic positions also differed only 
slightly in their perception and appraisal of income inequality. 
Not only did people of different sexes and ages hold similar 
attitudes, but even the classical stratification variables of 
education and occupation were not statistically significant.
• This individualized and meritocratic ideology forms the 
backbone of the “Hong Kong dream” or the “Hong Kong 
myth”; i.e., the belief in Hong Kong as a land of opportunities.
• Despite the widening polarization of incomes, only a minority 
of people do not believe that there are enough opportunities for 
the poor to improve their economic standing.
• It is this capitalist ethos that is causing the government and the 
people to undermine or ignore the economic and political 
foundations of poverty.
28
• A vivid example can be found in the core strategy recommended 
by the Commission on Poverty “to promote the policy of ‘From 
Welfare to Self-reliance’”. Rather than dealing with the 
structural causes of poverty, even the policy-makers are more 
inclined to emphasize individual strategies for closing the 
income gap. 
• This epitomizes both an unwavering faith in the market 
mechanism and a bias towards the “blaming-the-poor” approach.
• Stigmatizing the poor is definitely not a feasible approach to 
dealing with the problem of increasing income inequality.
• Our findings show that certain attitudes towards inequality are 
important predictors of perceptions of income inequality. These 
attitudes also mediate the effect of socio-economic positions on 
perceptions of income inequality.
• Future work should shed light on these mechanisms as well as 
on the social sources of such attitudes. 
